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I. INTRODUCTION
Since at least 1991, issues surrounding mandatory arbitration of
employment and other disputes' have intrigued, perplexed, angered,
gratified, and confounded academics, politicians, lawyers, and others.
* Samuel Estreicher, Dwight D. Opperman Professor of Labor Law and Director,
Center for Labor and Employment Law, N.Y.U. School of Law.
t Michael Heise, Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
T David S. Sherwyn, John and Melissa Ceriale Professor of Hospitality Human
Resources and Director of the Cornell Institute for Hospitality Labor and Employment
Relations, Cornell School of Hotel Administration.
1. This paper deals only with mandatory arbitration of employment disputes. The
issues concerning mandatory arbitration of consumer disputes are more difficult because
some consumer disputes are not amenable to individualized claims, whether in
arbitration or litigation. See generally Christopher R. Drahozal, AAA Consumer
Arbitration, in BEYOND ELITE LAW: ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 478, 478-92
(Samuel Estreicher & Joy Radice eds., 2016); Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha
Zyontz, An Empirical Study of AAA Consumer Arbitrations, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP.
RESOL. 843, 843-930 (2010); Peter B. Rutledge, Saturns for Rickshaws: Lessons for
Consumer Arbitration and Access to Justice, in BEYOND ELITE LAw: ACCESS TO CIVIL
JUSTICE IN AMERICA, supra, at 493, 493-505.
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Similar to many legal issues, the first wave of scholarly work centered
on the law. As the law has pretty much settled, academics have turned
to empirical work, focusing on how employment arbitration works, and
how it compares to employment litigation. In part due to pressure from
California legislation, 2 the American Arbitration Association ("AAA"),
the nation's leading provider of arbitration services, opened access to its
data base. Owing to inevitable data limitations, most analyses have
focused on outcomes-comparisons between litigation
verdicts/judgments and arbitration awards.
We wholeheartedly endorse good empirical work as an important
means of understanding and addressing controversial policy issues,
especially in the arbitration arena, and tried our hand at such work a
decade ago. 3 We have written this paper to encourage research that
goes beyond evaluating awards within the AAA data set and to engage
in a longitudinal study of the history of claims-from when they are
initially filed with administrative agencies or arbitration organizations
to when they are settled or adjudicated.
After an overview of U.S. arbitration law with respect to
employment claims, we examine current empirical work in this area,
highlight its relevance, identify its limitations, and outline the broad
contours of the type of work we believe is needed to advance the policy
debate.
II. OVERVIEW OF U.S. ARBITRATION LAW
The initial U.S. common law position on arbitration was one of
hostility. Courts viewed arbitration as a mechanism designed by private
parties to oust courts from their customary position as the principal
societal agent for dispute resolution.4 This hostility expressed itself in
the doctrine that specific performance was not available to enforce
arbitration promises until they resulted in an award and, even then, the
award would face difficulty obtaining enforcement in the courts.5 Since
this judicial position stymied commercial actors seeking to find a way of
resolving disputes without undergoing the expense, delay, and publicity
of lawsuits, a number of states passed arbitration acts to make
2. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96 (West 2015).
3. See generally David Sherwyn, Samuel Estreicher & Michael Heise, Assessing the
Case for Employment Arbitration: A New Path for Empirical Research, 57 STAN. L. REV.
1557 (2005).
4. See Red Cross Line v. Atl. Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 120-21 (1924) (discussing the
common law rule). See also Sherwyn, Estreicher & Heise, supra note 3, at 1574 n.88.
5. See Red Cross Line, 264 U.S. at 120-21.
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executory arbitration promises enforceable.6 This process culminated in
the enactment of the United States Arbitration Act in 1925, now
referred to as the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"). 7 The FAA declares
that all arbitration agreements "evidencing a transaction involving
commerce to settle" a dispute arising out of such transaction, whether it
be a future dispute or a dispute over an existing controversy "shall be
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 8
Over the last ninety years, the Supreme Court has steadily resolved
issues over the scope of the FAA in favor of arbitration.9 In Prima Paint
Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co., the Court held that the
statute applied in state (as well as federal) courts and adopted the so-
called "separability" doctrine providing that claims of fraud, and
presumably other grounds of invalidity, could not nullify an arbitration
agreement unless the complained-of fraud occurred in securing the
arbitration promise itself.10 Any doubts concerning whether the
"evidencing a transaction involving commerce" language confined the
FAA to 1925 notions of the federal power to regulate interstate
commerce were laid to rest in 1995,11 and a vigorous doctrine of FAA
preemption developed to render null state law attempts to disfavor
arbitration or regulate arbitration agreements differently than other
contracts. 12
Perhaps the biggest boost to arbitration came in the mid-1980s with
the Supreme Court's willingness to narrow, and in some cases overrule,
earlier decisions questioning whether the FAA required enforcement of
promises to arbitrate disputes governed by statutory law. 13 These
6. See Sidney P. Simpson, Specific Enforcement of Arbitration Contracts, 83 U. PA. L.
REV. 160, 167-70 (1934) (listing several states that enacted their own arbitration
legislation and noting a push for a federal arbitration act).
7. Federal Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as
amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2012)).
8. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
9. See, e.g., Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04
(1967).
10. Id. at 421.
11. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 275 (1995).
12. See, e.g., Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 490-91 (1987) (holding preempted state
wage payment claims despite state's declared policy that such claims "may be pursued
without regard to private arbitration agreements"); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S.
1, 15 (1984) (holding preempted state high court interpretation barring arbitration of
claims under California franchise investment law). See generally Christopher R.
Drahozal, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 79 IND. L.J. 393 (2004).
13. See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485 (1989). See also infra notes 21-26 and
accompanying text.
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decisions are particularly relevant to U.S. employment law, where most
employment relationships are terminable at-will and any claims
maintainable by employees (when not represented by labor unions) are
as a general matter based on federal statutes rather than contract. 14
A good illustration of this sea-change in FAA jurisprudence begins
with Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., a 1974 decision. 15 In that case,
Alexander, a union member-employee, was fired and arbitrated his
grievance under the employer's collective bargaining agreement with
the union representing him.16 At the arbitration, Alexander alleged his
employer discharged him because of his race.1 7 The arbitrator denied
the grievance and held there was "just cause" for termination under the
labor agreement.1 8 Subsequently, Alexander filed a race discrimination
case under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII")19 in
federal court, where the employer argued that arbitration was the
exclusive forum for the dispute, and that, in any event, the employee
had chosen to go to arbitration and could not relitigate a determination
made by the arbitrator that was necessary to the result reached in the
award.20
On review, the Supreme Court rejected the employer's argument
and found that the arbitration did not preclude Alexander's Title VII
lawsuit. 21 The Court reasoned that while arbitration was appropriate to
resolve the employee's contract claim, it was inappropriate for the
statutory claim because arbitrators generally lack authority and
competence to resolve statutory issues and, in this case, the union
representing the interests of the bargaining unit, not simply
Alexander's, controlled which matters would go to arbitration and
which arguments would be made to the arbitrator. 22
In keeping with its decisions in the 1980s extending the FAA to
disputes governed by federal statutes ranging from the antitrust laws, 23
the Racketeer-Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 24
14. See generally RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, EMPLOYMENT LAW ch. 1 (AM. LAW INST.
2015).
15. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
16. Id. at 38-40.
17. Id. at 42.
18. Id.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012).
20. See Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 43, 55-56.
21. See id. at 59-60.
22. See id. at 53, 56-58, 58 n.19.
23. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629
(1985) (holding antitrust disputes are subject to the FAA).
24. See Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 241-42 (1987) (holding
RICO claims are subject to the FAA).
378
2018] EVALUATING EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION 379
and the federal securities laws,25 the Court signaled a departure from
its view in Gardner-Denver regarding the authority and competence of
arbitrators to deal with statutory employment claims in Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. in 1991.26
In Gilmer, the employee-petitioner was required to sign an
arbitration agreement as a condition to accepting a position with
Interstate/Johnson that involved working as a registered representative
with the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE").27 The NYSE's rules
required brokers and other registered agents to resolve all employment
disputes in arbitration, organized under its auspices, and thus
purported to preclude registered representatives from filing cases in
court.28 After six years of employment, the company fired Gilmer, who
then filed an action under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967 ("ADEA")29 in federal court. 30 The employer countered with a
motion to compel arbitration under the FAA.31
The Gilmer Court held that arbitration should be compelled, and
distinguished Gilmer's case from Alexander's in Gardner-Denver
because Gilmer's promise to arbitrate stemmed from an individual
contract between Gilmer and his employer 32 and not a collective
bargaining agreement between an employer and a labor union
representing its employees. 33 Moreover, the Gilmer Court rejected the
25. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 482 (1989)
(holding securities disputes are subject to the FAA); McMahon, 482 U.S. at 238 (same).
26. See 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
27. Id. at 23.
28. See id.
29. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2012).
30. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23-24.
31. Id. at 24.
32. Id. at 33-34. The Court left open the effect of the FAA exclusion for "contracts of
employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in
foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). Justice White's majority opinion
explained that Gilmer had not raised the § 1 exclusion point and, in any event, his
arbitration promise was a condition of registration with the NYSE and not a condition of
employment with his employer. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 n.2. In Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001), the Court read this exclusion narrowly to reach only
contracts involving employees directly engaged in the transportation industry. Id. at 109.
For pre-Circuit City commentary, see Samuel Estreicher, Predispute Agreements to
Arbitrate Statutory Employment Claims, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1344, 1369-71 (1997). See
generally Samuel Estreicher, The Story of Gilmer v. Interstate Johnson/Lane Corp., in
EMPLOYMENT LAW STORIES (Samuel Estreicher & Gillian Lester eds., Foundation Press
2006).
33. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33-34. In 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247 (2009),
the Court rejected the argument that under Gardner-Denver labor arbitration pursuant to
a collective bargaining agreement could not prevent litigation. See generally id. See also
Samuel Estreicher, Living with Gardner-Denver, PERSPECTIVES ON WORK, Winter 2004,
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essential premise of Gardner-Denver that arbitrators were not
competent to hear statutory claims such as Gilmer's ADEA claims. 34
Gilmer also advanced several fairness issues-that the arbitration
promise was not voluntarily made but was wrested as a condition of
obtaining or maintaining employment, that the roster of arbitrators
from which he would have to pick an arbiter was assembled by the
NYSE, that there would be no written opinions, that discovery would be
limited, and that damages were likely to be lower than in litigation. 35
The Gilmer Court rejected these "generalized attacks on arbitration [as]
'rest[ing] on suspicion of arbitration as a method of weakening the
protections afforded in the substantive law to would-be complainants,'
and, as such, they are 'far out of step with our current strong
endorsement of the federal statutes favoring this method of resolving
disputes."' 36 On Gilmer's "knowing and voluntary" waiver contention,
the Court reiterated that unless the general law of contracts invalidated
the agreement, the fact that the arbitration promise was contained in
an adhesion contract did not preclude enforcement. 37 Moreover, the
NYSE rules provided for written awards, choice of arbitrator within the
NYSE rosters (by permitting unlimited challenges for cause and one
peremptory challenge), and did not preclude arbitrators from providing
the full range of relief available in court.38 As for discovery, the Court
noted, the point of arbitration is to obtain a more expeditious resolution
than in court and no showing had been made that the NYSE rules
afforded inadequate discovery to address claims. 39
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that when a party
agrees to arbitrate its claims, it agrees to a change in forum but "does
not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute" the party is
invoking.40 Accordingly, employment arbitrators must be given the
authority to adjudicate statutory claims in accordance with substantive
statutory requirements and award statutory remedies if violations are
found.
at 23-26 (published originally by the Industrial Relations Research Association, which is
now the Labor and Employment Relations Association (LERA)).
34. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30-32.
35. See id.
36. Id. at 30 (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S.
477, 481 (1989)).
37. Id. at 33 ("Of course, courts should remain attuned to well-supported claims that
the agreement to arbitrate resulted from the sort of fraud or overwhelming economic
power that would provide grounds 'for the revocation of any contract' (quoting Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985)).
38. Id. at 30-32.
39. See id. at 31.
40. Id. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628).
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Gilmer's effect on FAA jurisprudence has been to preclude broad-
scale challenges to employment arbitration. The FAA erects a strong
presumption of arbitrability requiring particularized challenges that,
for example, employees were not given sufficient notice that in agreeing
to arbitration they were giving up the right to a judicial forum, that the
fees for invoking arbitration effectively barred access to the arbitral
forum, or that the arbitration promise itself was unenforceable under
generally applicable state law of unconscionability. 4 1 Also, in 1995,
leading arbitration- organizations joined with the American Bar
Association and plaintiff and defense groups to promulgate a "Due
Process Protocol" which sets minimum standards for all employment
arbitration agreements and programs.42 These include a right to
representation (if you can afford it), an arbitrator who is well-versed in
employment law, written opinions, and authorization to award the full
range of statutory remedies available in court.4 3
Two open questions in this area include whether a provision in an
arbitration agreement or program waiving the employee's right to bring
a class or collective action is unenforceable because it violates a
substantive right under the particular statute invoked by the plaintiff,
and when the FAA must give way to a "contrary congressional
command" 44 in another statute that a court action may proceed without
regard to an arbitration promise or award.45
41. Richard A. Bales, The Employment Due Process Protocol at Ten: Twenty
Unresolved Issues, and a Focus on Conflicts of Interest, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL.
165, 185-95 (2005).
42. Id. at 171-73.
43. A Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes
Arising out of the Employment Relationship, AM. B. Ass'N (1997), https:/
www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/gp-solo-magazine-home/gp-solo-magazine
_index/labemp.html. See generally Bales, supra note 41, at 172-74; Samuel Estreicher &
Zev J. Eigen, The Forum for Adjudication of Employment Disputes, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE EcONOMICS OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 409 (Cynthia L. Estlund
& Michael L. Wachter eds., 2012). More recently, the National Academy of Arbitrators, a
prestigious body of arbitrators, has promulgated guidelines to improve the process of
arbitrator selection. See generally Theodore J. St. Antoine, Labor and Employment
Arbitration Today: Mid-Life Crisis or New Golden Age?, 32 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1,
17-19 (2017).
44. CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95, 103-04 (2012); Shearson/Am.
Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S 220, 226-27 (1987).
45. The extent to which administrative agency decisions or regulations can supply the
requisite "contrary congressional command" to override the FAA is the subject of Epic
Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 809 (2017) (Nos.16-285, et al.). See generally
David L. Noll, Who Regulates Arbitration? 43-44 (Aug. 22, 2017) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the Rutgers University Law Review).
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III. EMPIRICAL WORK ON EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION
In our 2005 Stanford Law Review article, we examined previously
published empirical work on employment arbitration.4 6 Specifically,
these studies compared litigation to arbitration with respect to
disposition time, win/loss records, the so-called "repeat player" effect,
and damages. 47 We focused on studies by Lewis Maltby, William M.
Howard, Elizabeth Hill, Theodore Eisenberg, and Lisa B. Bingham. 48
Since then, there have been substantial additions to the body of
empirical work on employment arbitration.
A. Disposition Times
On the question of the average length of time between the filing of a
claim and disposition, it is generally agreed that arbitration is faster
than litigation. Maltby found that arbitration took less than half the
time to resolve than litigation (679.5 days for litigation and 8.6 months
in arbitration). 49 In a 2011 paper, Colvin determined that litigation took
2.5 years from filing to trial while arbitration took just under one year
(361.5 days), and suggested that employment arbitrations are taking
longer than in the past.5 0 Even if the latter finding portends a trend,
arbitration remains twice as fast as litigation, on average.51 One could
argue, however, that the cases that go to arbitration are easier to
resolve than the cases that end up in litigation and that may be a
principal reason for the difference in disposition time. We are aware of
no study that attempts to control for the complexity of the cases that go
to litigation as opposed to arbitration.
B. Win Rates
The next question examined in these studies is whether claimant
win rates are lower in arbitration than in litigation. Nielsen, Nelson,
and Lancaster studied 1,672 cases filed in federal court between 1988
and 2003.52 Of the total number of cases filed, they found that 37% of
46. Sherwyn, Estreicher & Heise, supra note 3, at 1557-91.
47. Id. at 1567-81.
48. Id. at 1567 nn.33-38.
49. Id. at 1572.
50. Alexander J. S. Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case
Outcomes and Processes, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 8 (2011).
51. See id.
52. Laura Beth Nielsen et al., Individual Justice or Collective Legal Mobilization?
Employment Discrimination Litigation in the Post Civil Rights United States, 7 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 175, 176, 181 (2010).
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the cases were dismissed before trial (half on motions to dismiss and
half on motions for summary judgment), 58% were settled before trial,
and 100 cases (6%) went to trial.53 Employees prevailed in 32 of the
cases overall (2% of all the cases in their sample) and 32% of the cases
that went to trial.54
In our own review of 7316 AAA arbitration cases 55 that closed
during the 2012-2017 time period, 75.7% were settled and 847 cases
(11.6%) resulted in an arbitrator's award.56 The employee won 22.4% of
the cases resulting in an award.57
Colvin and Pike detected an increase in dismissal of arbitration
cases before hearing, finding that summary judgment motions were
filed in 28.9% of the cases (where they had access to the full file) and
the arbitrators issued a full dismissal in 14.1% of the total number of
cases and about 50% of the motions filed. 58They acknowledge that 14%
is a distinct minority of cases, but note that "summary judgment has
become a significant element in employment arbitration and that in a
number of cases it results in the plaintiff not being able to obtain a
hearing on the merits."59
While Colvin and Pike are correct that summary judgment is
becoming a somewhat more significant factor in arbitration, the
incidence of summary judgments against claimants is a good deal lower
than that found in litigation. Nielsen and co-authors found that in their
1998-2003 sample of 1672 litigated employment cases, 19% of the cases
were dismissed, 50% of the cases were settled early, and plaintiffs lost
on summary judgment in 18% of the cases.60 Maltby found that, in
litigation, motions accounted for 60% of the judicial terminations and
98% of terminations went against the plaintiff.6 1
53. See id. at 187.
54. See id. at 187.
55. The AAA dataset we used includes reported AAA arbitration results publicly
available as of May 9, 2017.
56. The AAA dataset includes 1,595 filings involving Macy's that were originally
coded as "dismissed." Further research, however, indicates that a substantial percentage
(if not, in fact, all) of these Macy's filings originally coded as "dismissals" are, in fact, more
accurately coded as "settled" disputes. If we exclude the originally coded Macy's-related
"dismissals, "the resulting universe of AAA arbitration results for the period in question
drops from 7,316 to 5,721 filings, the settlement rate drops to 68.9% and the arbitral
award percentage increases to 14.8%.
57. AM. ARB. AS'N, CONSUMER REP. Q3 2017 (on file with authors).
58. See Alexander J.S. Colvin & Kelly Pike, Saturns and Rickshaws Revisited: What
Kind of Employment Arbitration System Has Developed?, 29 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL.
59, 73 (2014).
59. Id.
60. Nielsen et al., supra note 52, at 184, 187 & fig. 1.
61. Sherwyn, Estreicher & Heise, supra note 3, at 1569.
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Comparison Studies on Arbitration and Litigation
Speed of Arbitration versus Speed of Litigation
Study Arbitration Litigation
Maltby 201 days 679 days
Colvin 361.5 days 709 days
Employee Win Rate in Arbitration versus Litigation
Study Arbitration Litigation
Nielson, Nelson, and Lancaster 2%
Howard 68% 28%
Eisenberg and Hill 26% 36%
Eisenberg --- 29.7%
(of cases that
went to verdict)
Colvin and Pike 24.7%*, 64.6%** ---
Hill 34% ---
Bingham 27.6% ---
Delikat and Kleiner 46% 33.6%
* Win rate where employer promulgated policies were the basis for arbitration
** Win rate for individually negotiated arbitration
In addition, Howard found that plaintiffs in court actions prevailed
28% of the time (38% in front of juries and 19% in bench trials) as
compared to AAA arbitrations where they prevailed 68% of the time. 62
Eisenberg and Hill found an employee win rate in federal court civil
rights cases of 36% and an arbitration win rate of 26%.63
In his final paper before his untimely death, our colleague Ted
Eisenberg examined civil rights case dispositions in federal courts from
1979-2013.64 He found that employment case terminations in federal
court declined over time-they peaked with 23,317 cases in 1998 and
declined to 16,789 by 2012.65 There were 491,506 employment
62. Id. at 1568. Howard's arbitration numbers are likely inflated by the fact that
many of the cases involved individually negotiated arbitration agreements as contrasted
with arbitration based on employer-promulgated polices where, as discussed below, the
former tend to involve higher-paid employees who may be more sophisticated and better-
represented than average claimants in employment litigation. See id. at 1569.
63. Id.
64. Theodore Eisenberg, Four Decades of Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 12 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 4, 5 (2015).
65. Id. at 12.
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discrimination cases terminated between 1979 and 2012.66 Of those
cases, 24,009 (4.8%) reached verdict.6 7 Of those that reached verdict,
juries decided 11,994 cases and judges decided 12,015 cases.68 Overall,
of the cases that went to verdict/judgment, employees won 29.7% of the
time.69 In front of juries, they were successful 38.8% of the time, 70 but
only 20.6% of the time in bench trials.7 1
The 2014 Colvin-Pike study included a comparison of arbitrations
based on unilateral employer policies and arbitrations based on
individual contracts. They report a win rate of 24.7% in the former
caseS 72 versus a win rate of 64.6% in individual contract cases. 73 In all
likelihood, the difference in outcomes reflects the fact that employees
with individual contracts are invariably high-wage earners who can
hire experienced counsel, do not get a new job right away, have the
means to pursue their cases, and have "cause" clauses where the
employer has to prove cause-as contrasted with employees working
under at-will contracts who have to prove discrimination or another
legal violation and generally cannot afford counsel.
Other studies have found somewhat different win rates. For
example, Hill found a 34% employee win rate for arbitrations based on
employer-promulgated handbooks, 74 while Bingham found a 27.6% win
rate for such cases. 75 Delikat and Kleiner compared 186 arbitrations
under security industry rules against employment trials in New York
66. Id. at 11 tbl.1.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See id. While plaintiffs fare much better with a jury than a judge, the reason is
not clear. It could be that (1) juries are more sympathetic to employees; (2) judges know
the law better; (3) judges are biased against employees; or (4) judges fear being
overturned on appeal. Eisenberg noted that judges dislike being overturned on appeal;
pro-plaintiff trial court decisions are overturned 43% of the time and pro-employer
decisions are overturned 10% of the time. Id. at 18.
72. Colvin & Pike, supra note 58, at 74.
73. Alexander J.S. Colvin, Mandatory Arbitration and Inequality of Justice in
Employment, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 71, 75-76 (2014).
74. Elizabeth Hill, AAA Employment Arbitration: A Fair Forum at Low Cost, 58 DiSP.
RESOL. J. 9, 13 (2003).
75. See Lisa B. Bingham & Shimon Sarraf, Employment Arbitration Before and After
the Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising out
of Employment: Preliminary Evidence That Self-Regulation Makes a Difference, in
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE EMPLOYMENT ARENA: PROCEEDINGS OF THE
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 53RD ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR, 303, 323 tbl.2 (Samuel
Estreicher & David Sherwyn eds., 2004).
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federal court: claimants won 33.6% of the time in litigation and 46% of
the time in arbitration.76
C. Repeat Players
Another focus of empirical work to date involves a comparison of the
win rates of employees in arbitrations where the employer is a repeat
player as compared to cases where the employer is not a repeat player. 7
These studies typically define "repeat players" as employers who have
had more than one arbitration in the applicable data set.7 8 "Repeat
employer-arbitrator" combinations are cases where the employers have
not only arbitrated before in the data set but have arbitrated before the
same arbitrator.79 Colvin examined a sample of 836 awards.80 He
found that "employees won only 14 out of the 124 cases (11.3%)
involving a repeat employer-arbitrator pair, compared to 151 out
of the 712 cases (21.2%) that did not involve a repeat employer-
arbitrator pair."8 1 The employee win rate against repeat player
employers only was higher than that for repeat employer-arbitrator
pairs, but the difference was "not statically significant." 82
Do these repeat-player results demonstrate arbitrator bias? Do they
suggest that mandatory arbitration presents a forum likely to yield
systematically worse results for employees than litigation? Data and
research design limitations, in our view, cast doubt over the policy
implications that can reasonably be drawn from these studies. First,
repeat players are labeled repeat players simply because their second
case is in the data set,8 3 but researchers include the first case in
76. Michael Delikat & Morris M. Kleiner, An Empirical Study of Dispute Resolution
Mechanisms: Where Do Plaintiffs Better Vindicate Their Rights?, 58 DIsP. RESOL. J. 56,
57-58 (2003).
77. See Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1
EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 189, 202 (1997) [hereinafter The Repeat Player Effect]; Lisa
B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of Statistics in
Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration Awards, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 223, 232-
33 (1998) [hereinafter On Repeat Players].
78. E.g., The Repeat Player Effect, supra note 77, at 207; On Repeat Players, supra
note 77, at 237.
79. Colvin refers to this "double repeat player" effect as the "repeat employer-
arbitrator" effect. See Alexander J.S. Colvin, Empirical Research on Employment
Arbitration: Clarity Amidst the Sound and Fury?, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 405, 430
(2007) [hereinafter Colvin, Empirical Research on Employment Arbitration]; Sherwyn,
Estreicher & Heise, supra note 3, at 1571 & n. 6 4 (citing Bingham & Sarraf, supra
note 75, at 323 tbl.2; On Repeat Players, supra note 77, at 323 tbl.2).
80. Colvin, Empirical Research on Employment Arbitration, supra note 79, at 430.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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measuring the repeat players' win/loss record. 84 This placement begs a
critical question: how did the arbitrator in the first case know the
employer would be a repeat player and thus arguably have been
influenced by the prospect of repeat business with that company.
More importantly, the repeat-player studies make no attempt to
control for the size and claims experience of repeat-player employers-
factors likely to spell higher win rates for such employers both in
litigation as well as arbitration. Our intuition is that repeat players are
simply larger, more sophisticated employers with multi-step grievance
procedures. Employees are likely to fare worse against these employers
as compared to smaller employers with fewer resources and less claims
experience irrespective of whether the claim is brought in court or
before an arbitrator. The large repeat-player employers are not
arbitrating only one-off "for cause" employment contracts with senior
executives.8 5 Rather, they are arbitrating employment claims for nearly
their entire workforce.86 Arbitration, moreover, is not the first step in
the dispute resolution process promulgated by these employers. Instead,
employer-promulgated employment arbitration policies generally
contain a multiple-step grievance procedure that includes some form of
mediation or peer review before cases can go to arbitration.8 7 Thus, the
parties have, in many cases, engaged in a relatively non-adversarial
process that allows for settlements or other types of resolutions short of
an arbitral award. Strong cases on the merits are likely to be settled;
they generally do not result in awards.88 Cases that go to hearing are
likely to involve relatively weak employee claims pressed by employees
who either represent themselves or are represented by inexperienced
counsel. Thus, employers that appear in data sets as repeat players or
double repeat players should have significantly better win records than
non-repeat players.8 9 Similarly, experienced employers should have
better win/loss records than inexperienced employers in litigation and
before administrative agencies as well. We contend that the proper
comparison for repeat-player employers in arbitration should be with
repeat-player employers in litigation. We know of no such work.
84. Id. at 431.
85. See Sherwyn, Estreicher & Heise, supra note 3, at 1570.
86. See id.
87. See, e.g., Richard A. Bales & Jason N.W. Plowman, Compulsory Arbitration as
Part of a Broader Employment Dispute Resolution Process: The Anheuser-Busch
Example, 26 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1, 17-24 (2008); Alexander J.S. Colvin,
Employment Arbitration: Empirical Findings and Research Needs, 64 DisP. RESOL.
J. 6, 11 (2009) [hereinafter Colvin, Employment Arbitration].
88. See Sherwyn, Estreicher & Heise, supra note 3, at 1566 n.31.
89. See id. at 1570.
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D. Damages
As a general rule, plaintiffs on average receive lower damages in
arbitration cases that go to hearing and result in an award than they do
in litigation cases that go to trial and result in a verdict/judgment.90
The median trial verdict/judgment in Eisenberg's 1979-2013 sample
was $153,463.91 Delikat and Kleiner compared securities industry
arbitrations to employment cases that went to trial in federal court. 92
The securities industry awards had a mean of $236,292 while the mean
verdict/judgment in employment litigation cases was $377,030.93 The
median award in securities industry arbitrations was $100,000 while
the median verdict/judgment was $95,554 in employment litigation
cases.94 Eisenberg and Hill found a mean of $336,291 and a median of
$150,500 in 408 federal employment discrimination cases. 95 Colvin
studied 165 AAA employment arbitration cases where the employee
was awarded damages and the median award was $117,715, and the
average award was $40,624.96 Maltby compared arbitration awards to
the amounts demanded by the complainants when they filed their
claims.9 7 He found that the mean demand in litigation was $756,738 as
compared with $165,128 in arbitration.98 Winning plaintiffs in litigation
obtained recoveries that were 70% of the mean demand at $530,611 and
successful claimants in arbitration obtained awards that were 25% of
the mean demand at $49,030.99
To understand average awards in arbitration, we need better data
on the income levels of successful claimants. Damages in employment
cases are based on back pay and less often punitive damages. 100 It could
be the case that arbitration cases resulting in awards feature lower-
paid employees than average claimants in litigations that reach a
90. See Colvin, Employment Arbitration, supra note 87, at 8 (comparing the average
expected awards in arbitration cases with those expected in litigation cases).
91. Eisenberg, supra note 64, at 11 tbl.1.
92. Delikat & Kleiner, supra note 76, at 57.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Arbitration and Litigation of Employment
Claims: An Empirical Comparison, 58 DISP. RESOL. J. 44, 49 tbl.2 (2004).
96. Colvin, Employment Arbitration, supra note 87, at 8.
97. .Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30
COLUM. HuM. RTs. L. REV. 29, 30 (1998).
98. Id. at 49 tbl.1.
99. Id.
100. Colvin found no punitive damages awards in his arbitration data set, noting that
punitive damages are rare in both litigation and arbitration. Colvin & Pike, supra note
58, at 77.
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decision on the merits.1 01 Colvin notes that those pursuing arbitration
cases were "lower to middle income" employees making less than
$100,000 per year.102 Thus, the prevalence of lower-paid employees over
typically higher-paid plaintiffs in litigation may explain the difference
in average awards.
Another factor is time. As a general rule, higher-paid employees
take longer to find new employment. If higher-paid employees are
better candidates for litigation and are out of work longer than the
lower-paid arbitration claimants, then it would stand to reason that
their recoveries in litigation would be higher than claimant recoveries
in arbitration.
A decisive factor, developed below, is that relatively weaker
claims-where claimants are unable to attract competent counsel-are
more likely to go to an arbitration hearing on the merits than in
litigation to verdict. If so, we should expect average awards in
arbitration to be considerably lower than average verdicts/judgments in
litigation.
IV. EVALUATION OF EXISTING EmPIRIcAL WORK
A. Using EEOC Filings and Dispositions as a Proxy for the Universe of
Employment Law Claims
To a very considerable extent, the empirical work on employment
arbitration consists of a comparison of win rates and size of awards in
arbitration with win rates and size of verdicts or judgments in court.103
This is an unsatisfying comparison for two reasons. First, litigation and
arbitration differ. In litigation, there are substantial hurdles that
claims must overcome for a case to result in a verdict or judgment. In
arbitration, by contrast, there is reason to believe that employment
claims do not face similar hurdles, whether or not claimants are
represented by counsel. If this is correct, win rates and size of awards
are likely to be lower in arbitration than in court without this difference
being very revealing about the comparative merits of arbitration versus
litigation.
Second, even if these differences are neither systematic nor
significant, what cannot be contested, however, is that the vast majority
of employment disputes are not resolved by litigation verdict/judgment
101. See id. at 79.
102. Id.
103. See supra Part II.
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or arbitration award. 104 To put this point more formally, what most
scholars study in this setting (cases resulting in verdicts/judgments or
arbitration awards) systematically differs from the much broader
universe of cases that initiate legal or arbitration processes.
To get a sense of the universe of claims that enter the arbitration
process, we need to examine the filing of charges of discrimination with
the relevant administrative agencies, notably the federal Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and analogous state and
federal agencies. Our assumption is that the overwhelming majority of
employment claims, that end up in litigation or arbitration, start out as
employment discrimination charges filed with one of the administrative
agencies. In the last 20 years, the EEOC received between 15,000 and
100,000 charges each year.105 While the exact numbers are difficult to
find, we may safely assume that additional filings with state or local
agencies are equal to that number. 106 In the years 2000, 2005, 2011,
2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015 the EEOC resolved 671,997 cases with a
yearly range from 77,352 (2005) to 112,499 (2011) cases and an
average of 96,000 per year.107 The EEOC labels its resolutions as either
merit or non-merit.10 8 Merit resolutions consist of the following:
settlements, successful conciliations, unsuccessful conciliations, and
withdrawals with benefits. 109 Three of these categories result in some
104. Vivian Berger et al., Summary Judgment Benchmarks for Settling Employment
Discrimination Lawsuits, 23 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 45, 46 (2005).
105. Charge Statistics (Charges Filed with EEOC) FY 1997 Through FY 2017, U.S.
EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/
charges.cfm (last visited May 3, 2018).
106. See David Sherwyn et al., In Defense of Mandatory Arbitration of Employment
Disputes: Saving the Baby, Tossing Out the Bath Water, and Constructing a New Sink in
the Process, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 73, 77-78 (1999).
107. All Statutes (Charges filed with EEOC) FY 1997 - FY 2017, U.S. EQUAL EMP.
OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/all.cfm (last
visited May 3, 2018).
108. See Sherwyn, Estreicher & Heise, supra note 3, at 1584; Definition of Terms, U.S.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/
enforcement/definitions.cfm (last visited Jan. 18, 2018).
109. The EEOC defines the terms as follows:
Settlements (Negotiated)[:] Charges settled with benefits to the charging party as
warranted by evidence of record. In such cases, EEOC and/or a FEPA is a party
to the settlement agreement between the charging party and the respondent (an
employer, union, or other entity covered by EEOC-enforced statutes). Successful
Conciliation[:] Charge with reasonable cause determination closed after
successful conciliation. Successful conciliations result in substantial relief to the
charging party and all others adversely affected by the discrimination.
Unsuccessful Conciliation [:] Charge with reasonable cause determination closed
after efforts to conciliate the charge are unsuccessful. Pursuant to Commission
policy, the field office will close the charge and review it for litigation
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sort of "benefit" to the charging party. 1 0 The remaining category,
unsuccessful conciliations, is comprised of resolutions where the parties
have not resolved the case, there are no benefits obtained, and the
employee receives a right-to-sue letter, which is a prerequisite to filing
a Title VII lawsuit.111
In the years mentioned above, there were 105,181 merit resolutions
in which the employee received some (usually monetary) benefit and
20,504 resolutions where the EEOC found cause and the charging party
either was given a right-to-sue letter or the EEOC filed a lawsuit on
the employee's behalf.112 During these years, the EEOC filed 1462
"merit suits" 113 for an average of 209 such actions per year (or 0.2% of
total charges filed). 114 These 209 court actions represent 7% of the total
number of cases where the agency found cause but could not reach a
settlement with the respondent employer.115
consideration. NOTE: Because "reasonable cause" has been found, this is
considered a merit resolution. Withdrawal with Benefits [:] Charge is withdrawn
by charging party upon receipt of desired benefits. The withdrawal may take
place after a settlement or after the respondent grants the appropriate benefit to
the charging party.
Definition of Terms, supra note 108 (emphasis added).
110. See Sherwyn, Estreicher & Heise, supra note 3, at 1583-85.
111. Id. at 1584-85.
112. All Statutes (Charges Filed with EEOC) FY1997-FY2017, supra note 107.
113. See EEOC Litigation Statistics, FY 1997 through FY 2017, U.S. EQUAL EMP.
OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/litigation.cfm
(last visited May 3, 2018). "Merits suits include direct suits and interventions alleging
violations of the substantive provisions of the statutes enforced by the Commission and
suits to enforce administrative settlements. Intervention is where the EEOC joins a
lawsuit that has been filed by a private plaintiff." Id. (emphasis added).
114. Id.; Charge Statistics (Charges Filed with EEOC) FY 1997 Through FY 2017,
supra note 105.
115. See supra notes 112-114 and accompanying text.
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Breakdown of EEOC Cases in 2000, 2005, 2011-2015
Total Number of Cases Resolved 671,997
Total number of merit resolutions in which
employees received some monetary benefit 105,181
Percent of total cases 16%
Total number of cases in which employees
received a right-to-sue letter or case was filed on
employee's behalf 20,504
Percent of total cases 3%
Total number of merit resolutions resulting in
"merit lawsuits" 1,462
Percent of total cases 0.22%
The remaining cases are labeled as non-meritorious. Non-
meritorious cases fall into one of two categories: (1) administrative
closures1 16 or (2) no reasonable cause findings. 117 In these non-
meritorious cases, the employee receives no benefit but is given a right-
to-sue letter. 118 In the years in question, the EEOC labeled 111,971
(16.7%) resolutions as administrative closings and 434,341 (64.6%) as
demonstrating no reasonable cause for a total of 546,312 administrative
or no-cause closings or 81.3% of the cases. 119 In these cases, the
employees, like the 19,042 claimants who received "cause" findings but
did not have the EEOC file a lawsuit on their behalf, received right-to-
sue letters.
116. Administrative Closure is a
[C]harge closed for administrative reasons, which include: failure to locate
charging party, charging party failed to respond to EEOC communications,
charging party refused to accept full relief, closed due to the outcome of related
litigation which establishes a precedent that makes further processing of the
charge futile, charging party requests withdrawal of a charge without receiving
benefits or having resolved the issue, no statutory jurisdiction.
Definitions of Terms, supra note 108.
117. "EEOC's determination of no reasonable cause to believe that discrimination
occurred based upon evidence obtained in investigation. The charging party may exercise
the right to bring private court action." Id. (emphasis added).
118. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Language Access Plan, U.S. EQUAL
EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/lap.cfm (last visited May 3,
2018).
119. All Statutes (Charges Filed with the EEOC) FY 1997 - FY 2017, supra note 107.
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Thus, out of the 671,997 cases resolved by the EEOC in the years
studied, 565,354 (84.1%) received right-to-sue letters with no
benefits. 120 While it remains possible that some of these claimants
settled the case after receiving their right-to-sue letter, it seems
unlikely. To test our intuition, we reached out to 10 prominent
management-side employment lawyers and asked if any of them had
ever settled a case after the EEOC labeled it as (1) no reasonable cause,
(2) administrative closing, or (3) an unsuccessful conciliation. Each
lawyer stated that they could not remember ever settling such a case;
instead, they waited for the employee to file suit in federal court before
they even considered a settlement. This raises the question: how many
of the 565,354 administrative or "no-cause" cases end up being filed in
federal court? Not very many, we suspect.
In the years we studied, the total number of employment
discrimination cases filed in federal court was 105,585 (with a range of
21,032 in 2000 to 11,937 in 2014).121 If we assume that claimants
receiving an EEOC right-to-sue letter, which is a statutory prerequisite
to a Title VII suit, bring an action within the year of receipt, then a
lawsuit was filed in 18.7% of the cases in which the employees such a
letter. 122 We do not know what happened in the 81% of the cases in
which the employee received a right-to-sue letter and no lawsuit
eventuated. What were the "benefits" received by the claimants who
had their cases fully resolved by the EEOC conciliation? What
happened to the cases that were filed in court? We are not aware of any
previous work that systematically addresses these questions.
In the 12 months ending in March 2016, the number of employment
cases that reached trial (not that were resolved at trial, but just reached
that stage of litigation) represented 1.9% of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA)1 23 cases and 2.3% of the remaining employment
discrimination cases. 124 We cannot be sure if these numbers from 2015-
120. See supra notes 112-119 and accompanying text.
121. U.S. District Courts-Civil Cases Filed, by Nature of Suit, U.S. COURTS, http://
www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/datatables/Table4.04.pdf (last visited May 3, 2018).
122. We are assuming that the EEOC resolutions in a given year are eligible for a
federal court filing in that year-a reasonable assumption since Title VII requires that
suit be brought within 90 days of receipt of the right-to-sue letter. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(f)(1) (2012).
123. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012)).
124. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. See Table C-4. U.S. District Courts-
Civil Cases Terminated, by Nature of Suit and Action Taken, During the 12-Month Period
Ending March 31, 2016, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/
data-tables/fls-c4_0331.2016.pdf (last visited May 3, 2018), where the federal court
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2016 are representative of each of the years we studied. For purposes of
the analysis below, we assume that the 2015-2016 numbers are
representative of all the years we studied, use the higher percentage,
and, to make the number the most "litigation friendly," assume that all
those cases that reached trial actually went to verdict or judgment, as
opposed to being settled or otherwise dismissed. Under these
assumptions, 2317 cases went to verdict/judgment in the years we
studied. If we round up and assume that 2500 cases in the years
studied went to verdict/judgment, then 0.37% of the cases filed with the
EEOC in those years went to verdict/judgment. Obviously, inferences
based on 0.37% of the universe of employment discrimination claims are
likely fragile, even if these cases are representative of the entire
universe of claims, which they are not.
B. Cases Resolved at Trial Are Not Representative of the Universe of
Employment Law Claims
Cases that go to trial are anomalies for a number of reasons. First,
plaintiffs' lawyers are rational actors and typically do not take cases
unless they see a significant potential return to warrant their time and
effort. 125 They will take cases for settlement purposes that may be
relatively weak on the merits but exhibit other characteristics that
suggest a prompt resolution.126 But unless lawyers are directly
compensated by the client or third party for their time, the cases they
are willing to expend significant time and effort on are likely to be
relatively strong on the merits and suggest recovery of substantial
damages.127
Since the EEOC finds no merit in at least 80% of their cases, we can
assume that cases with clear liability are rare. 128 As employers have
become more accustomed to employment legislation regulating their
system reported the number of cases that reached trial in a variety of different types of
cases. Civil Rights employment was a category as was ADA employment. Id.
125. David Sherwyn & Michael Sturman, Because It Takes Two: Why Post-Dispute
Voluntary Arbitration Programs Will Fail to Fix the Problems Associated with
Employment Discrimination Law Adjudication, in 53 ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
IN THE EMPLOYMENT ARENA 405, 442 (Samuel Estreicher & David Sherwyn eds., 2004).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See All Statutes (Charges filed with EEOC) FY 1997 - FY 2017, supra note 107.
"Charges with outcomes favorable to charging parties and/or charges with meritorious
allegations" represented no more than 19.2% of the "total number of charges filed and
resolved under all statutes enforced by EEOC" in any single year between 2010 and 2016.
Id.; Definition of Terms, supra note 108.
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decisions, blatant "smoking guns" will rarely surface. 129 In addition,
employers are generally risk-averse, so if there is clear liability they
will likely settle and there will be no trial. 130 Most of the cases with
smoking guns will settle, although a few cases may go to trials because
the parties or their counsel disagree on how to value the claims. 131
The prospect of substantial damages, moreover, will be necessary to
attract competent plaintiff counsel to an employment case. 13 2 In 1991,
Donohue and Siegelman found that absent clear liability, it is
economically infeasible for plaintiffs (and by extension their lawyers) to
pursue cases where employees earn less than $450 per week. 133
Converting Donohue and Siegelman's finding into 2017 dollars implies
that the current threshold is $787.85 per week. 134 According to the
Bureau of Labor Statistics, the median wage for all full-time workers in
the third quarter of 2017 was $859.135 Breaking it down. further, the
median weekly income for white men was $965, white women $791,
African American men $744, African American women $658, Hispanic
men $698, Hispanic women $597, Asian men $1147, and Asian women
$902.136 What this means is that it makes little economic sense for
plaintiffs' lawyers, absent relatively clear liability, to take cases for
more than half of all part-time employees and more than half of all full-
time African-American and Hispanic employees. 137 Only slightly more
129. See Eisenberg, supra note 64, at 21, 24 ("[T]he decline in employment cases ...
since 1997 is partly attributable to statutory developments that may have led to
temporary case increases while new rights were preliminarily explored.").
130. See Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What Is the Settlement Rate and
Why Should We Care?, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111, 113 (2009) ("Although objective
success in litigation can be difficult to define, if a plaintiff is to recover something in a
case seeking monetary relief, and therefore to succeed at least in part by an objective
measure, recovery is far more likely to be via settlement than via trial.").
131. See generally Eisenberg, supra note 64, at 9 ("The declining number of
employment cases over time and an increase in employment case settlement rates over
time are evidence that plaintiffs, or their attorneys, are shifting the profile of cases
filed.").
132. See Sherwyn, Estreicher & Heise, supra note 3, at 1574-75.
133. See John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment
Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1007-08 (1991).
134. See Elizabeth B. Appelbaum, The Consumer Price Index and Inflation-Calculate
and Graph Inflation Rates, MATHEMATICAL Ass'N OF AM., https://www.maa.org/press/
periodicals/lociljomalthe-consumer-price-index-and-inflation-calculate-and-graph-
inflation-rates (last visited May 3, 2018).
135. Usual Weekly Earnings of Wage and Salary Workers: Third Quarter 2017, U.S.
DEP'T OF LABOR (Oct. 18, 2017, 10:00 AM), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/
wkyeng.pdf.
136. Id.
137. See id.
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than half of all white women pass the Donohue-Siegelman threshold.138
Thus, if the Donohue-Siegelman estimate is correct, the majority of
African-American and Hispanic men and women are excluded from trial
data, and only a slight majority of white women are included.
When EEOC charge data are broken down, they reveal that 36% of
all cases are race bias charges and that African-Americans file 82.5% of
these charges while Asian/Pacific Islanders file 3%.139 Claimed national
origin discrimination accounts for 11% of charges and Hispanics filed
50% of national-origin charges. 140 Sex discrimination claims make up
30% of EEOC charges 141 with a large majority of cases filed by
women. 142 Indeed, only 17% of all sexual harassment charges are filed
by men.143 Thus, if we apply the Donohue-Siegelman estimate (as
converted into 2017 dollars), one can see that fewer than half of the
people in groups that file the majority of claims earn enough money to
have a lawyer take their cases to court.
Another factor that influences plaintiff counsels' decision to take on
an employment matter is whether the employer will be able to pay the
damages. 144 Unfortunately, we have no data on the size or capitalization
of companies that are sued in either federal court or in arbitration.
When plaintiffs' lawyers take on a case, they typically commit
substantial resources. 145 Litigation takes, on average, over two years
from filing to resolution. 146 In addition, since most plaintiffs cannot
afford to pay their lawyers' hourly rate, the attorney must take the case
on a contingency basis and thus must fund the lawsuit's costs with
regard to depositions, experts, etc. 147 Many plaintiffs' lawyers will not
take a case without thousands of dollars in a retainer from the
employee. 148 Thus, often unemployed and modestly paid (when
employed) plaintiffs need to not only have a claim exhibiting the
prospect of substantial damages from an employer that can afford to
pay, they must also be able to afford a side-payment retainer to attract
138. See id.
139. Charge Statistics (Charges filed with EEOC) FY 1997 Through FY 2017, supra
note 105.
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. See Charges Alleging Sex-Based Harassment (Charges filed with EEOC) FY 2010 -
FY 2017, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/
enforcement/sexualharassment-new.cfm (last visited May 3, 2018).
143. See id.
144. See Sherwyn, Estreicher & Heise, supra note 3, at 1574-75.
145. See id. at 1574.
146. See id. at 1572-73.
147. See id. at 1574 n.88.
148. See id. at 1574-75.
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the lawyer and have the time to assist the lawyer when needed. The
bottom line is that the 0.36% of the cases that make it to verdict or
judgment are not representative of the vast majority of the types of
cases filed with the EEOC, state agencies, or in arbitration.
At bottom, selection bias invariably limits comparisons of outcomes
in litigation and arbitration. One cannot plausibly infer that the stream
of cases that go to arbitration and those that proceed in litigation are
comparable in all respects other than what happens to their claims in
the two forums. 149
V. POSSIBLE RESEARCH DESIGNS GOING FORWARD
To better address the critical selection biases that limit comparisons
of litigation and arbitration outcomes, we suggest that future studies
adopt research designs that incorporate better controls. In this section,
we suggest possibly useful approaches for future research in this area.
Studies properly focus in employer-promulgated programs that
result in arbitrations. Although critics contend that such programs are
unfair because they are designed and implemented by employers
149. We also question the use of limited survey data. It has been argued that
employment arbitration presents a "black hole" problem where claims disappear that
might otherwise appear on court dockets. See generally Cynthia Estlund, The Black Hole
of Mandatory Arbitration, 96 N.C. L. REV. 679 (2018). The argument is based on a
comparison of the number of federal employment cases filed in a given year (and an
estimate of state court cases) with the number of arbitrations filed in a given year drawn
from AAA data compiled in response to California legislation. See supra note 2 and
accompanying text. Such comparisons are difficult to make for a variety of reasons. One
difficulty is that we do not have reliable information on the number of employers who
require mandatory arbitration of employment disputes. Surveys of lawyers who have
represented employees in arbitration can at best tell us only what responding lawyers
know. See Estlund, supra at 684-85, nn.26-27 (citing ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN & MARK D.
GOUGH, COMPARING MANDATORY ARBITRATION AND LITIGATION: ACCESS, PROCESS, AND
OUTCOMES 34-35 (2014)). A more recent survey of 527 nonunion employers may add to
our body of knowledge, but should not be generalized across all employers. Id. at 689
nn.62-63 (citing ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN, ECON. POLICY INST., THE GROWING USE OF
MANDATORY ARBITRATION (2017), epi.org/135056). We also do not have good information
on the number of employment arbitrations. We believe that the Colvin-Gough estimate
that 70% of all arbitrations are conducted under the auspices of two leading arbitration
organizations, the AAA and JAMS, see COLVIN & GOUGH, supra, at 35, vastly overstates
their influence in the field. We also note that many employer-promulgated arbitration
programs provide for internal steps and mediation before arbitration can occur; these are
implemented for the purpose of early dispute resolution and would reduce the incidence of
employee claims resulting in arbitration. Professor Estlund's article suggests that in
recent years employers have forgone these intermediate steps because their principal
interest is in securing class action waivers rather than internal disputes resolution. See
Estlund, supra at 698-99. This has not been our experience to date in evaluating
company systems, but the existence of any such recent trend warrants further study.
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without employee, union, or government input,150 in our experience this
has not necessarily been the case. 15 1 Rather, we believe most employer-
promulgated programs are fairly designed because of the self-interest of
employers to have enforceable programs that successfully avoid
litigation,1 52 . the insistence of leading arbitration organizations on
compliance with the requirements of the "due process protocol," 153 and
relevant case law on arbitration fees.15 4 Specifically, most employer-
promulgated programs (that we are familiar with) provide for several
in-house steps, such as internal and/or external mediation, which end in
arbitration with a nationally recognized organization (e.g., AAA or
JAMS). These organizations maintain rosters of arbitrators experienced
in employment law, as well as rules that require disclosure of prior
arbitrator involvement with the parties and authorize the award of full
statutory remedies if violations are found.155
While we are certainly aware of anecdotal accounts of arbitrator
policies that feature limited damages, no choice of arbitrator, or other
types of unfair procedures, what we do not yet know is whether these
"unfair" policies are the small exception or, instead, reflect a real
problem in the field.
At the same time, future research will also need to focus on the
more than 99% of the EEOC/litigation cases 15 6 and the more than 88%
of the arbitration cases that do not result in a verdict/judgment or
award.15 7 The first question is what is the total number of cases or
n? As stated above, every arbitration policy we have seen contains
several steps prior to arbitration. 15 8 In a perfect world, we would study
all cases where the employment dispute resolution policy was utilized.
Such an approach will be difficult for several reasons. First, existing
studies of employer internal dispute systems reveal that almost all
cases are resolved in less than one month, and the resolutions often
involve disputes that that do not necessarily raise a legally cognizable
claim. Second, finding the necessary data would be both difficult and
what data can be found may not be representative; in particular, those
employers willing to share all of their data are likely to do so because
150. See, e.g., Janna Giesbrecht-McKee, The Fairness Problem: Mandatory Arbitration
in Employment Contracts, 50 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 259, 261 (2014).
151. See Sherwyn, Estreicher & Heise, supra note 3, at 1563-64.
152. See id. at 1560.
153. Id. at 1562.
154. Id. at 1557-59, 1561-63, 1565, 1582-83.
155. See Sherwyn, Estreicher & Heise, supra note 3, at 1571.
156. See supra Section IV.A.
157. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 149 and accompanying text.
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they have successful, systems. Employers with poorly designed systems
would be correspondingly less willing to share data. Third, the
complaints or claims emanating from internal dispute systems are not
likely to easily match up with EEOC data. Employers who do not have
arbitration policies as such still have harassment and EEO polices, and
thus instead of judging arbitration as opposed to EEOC/litigation
systems, we would then be looking at different internal dispute
resolution programs. For these reasons, we suggest that future
researchers focus on cases where an employee goes outside the
company's internal processes by filing a charge with the EEOC or filing
for arbitration with an external arbitrator.
We are aware of two possible such data sets that hold potential
promise. One data set draws from data that AAA makes publicly
available: five years of arbitration filings with the Association. 15 9 A
second source of necessary data involves the EEOC's charge data for a
similar time period. Specifically, what would be needed is the ability to
track down all cases where the EEOC issued a notice of right to sue
letter, a prerequisite to a Title VII lawsuit.
Researchers armed with these two sources of data would be
comparatively better positioned to study and compare two distinct
streams of cases: those investigated and "resolved" by the EEOC, as
well as those resolved through arbitration. Of course, there are
significantly more cases filed with the EEOC than in arbitration. 16 0
Specifically, for example, an already-public AAA arbitration data set
includes close to 7,500 cases. In contrast, there were approximately
500,000 EEOC cases resolved in the same time period. 16 1 Coordinating
these two separate data sets to facilitate comparability across them will
require attention to an array of practical and logistical factors.
Researchers should endeavor to provide a life history for cases filed
in a sample period. It would be important to see whether claimants are
represented by counsel and at what stage of the process and whether
representation corresponds with systematically different outcomes for
claimants. Another critical factor involves settlement activity-when
this occurs as well as comparing settled and litigated results for
claimants. For those cases that resist settlement, attention should be
paid to those cases dismissed by courts prior to trial and by arbitrators
prior to hearing, and what the basis for dismissal was (whether the case
159. AAA Consumer Arbitration Statistics, AM. ARB. Ass'N, https://www.adr.org/
Consumer (last visited May 3, 2018).
160. Compare All Statutes (Charges filed with EEOC) FY 1997 - FY 2017, supra note
107, with AAA Consumer Arbitration Statistics, supra note 159.
161. See All Statutes (Charges filed with EEOC) FY 1997 - FY 2017, supra note 107.
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was untimely filed or there was some other jurisdictional failure, or
whether there was a summary judgment-type determination on the
merits).
It is vitally important that future research undertakes analyses of
all initiated disputes rather than on a systematically non-
representative fraction of disputes that persist to a verdict/judgment or
an arbitrator's award. By so doing, we can begin to address the critical
selection-bias problems that severely limit much of the existing
literature in this field. Such a research program would be far better
positioned to contribute to a scholarly and practical debate that has
persisted for nearly three decades: are employees compelled to submit
their employment disputes to arbitration worse or better off than
employees free to pursue litigation for comparable claims?
